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Examining January 6th: Rights, Human Rights, and the Human Rights “Age” 
 
By the time readers get this, events may have faded partially from view. Still, I would imagine 
that not a small number of us were shocked by the events unfolding at the American Capitol on 
January 6th. A short recap: 
• First, among the many theories promoted by, if not the Trump government, then Trump 
himself, were claims made immediately in the wake of 2016 that the President lost the 
popular vote due to illegal ballots and significant voter fraud. In a November 27th 
tweet—iterating claims Trump would make a number of times—the then-President-Elect 
argued that if one deducted the “millions of people who voted illegally,” he would have 
beaten Hillary Clinton handily, by which he meant again in the at-large vote as well as 
the Electoral College.1 It’s a controversial point around American elections; can minority 
Presidents be said to represent the popular will? Some accept the idea in the face of 
American federalism.2 For Trump, however, it was taken as a threat to his legitimacy. 
When George Bush lost the popular election to Al Gore, it was by half a million votes. 
When Trump lost to Clinton, three million more Americans voted for the person who 
didn’t win as opposed to the one who did. Only skullduggery could be behind it, Trump 
maintained—a point which he would insist on, come what may.3 
• Still, faced with skepticism towards such claims, post-the-Inauguration, Trump instituted 
a presidential advisory commission on electoral as a manner of bolstering his arguments 
and addressing theoretical irregularities in America’s voting system.4 However, finding 
few such things, the commission was abandoned in January 2018, with several members 
going public to suggest the project as problematic from the start. “It was the most bizarre 
thing I’ve ever been a part of,” one member argued, as what they were doing except the 
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President’s bidding was unclear—and even in that context, few were clear about the 
mandate.5  
• With the run-up to 2020, however, the issue emerged again. On August 17th, the 
President said that “the only way we’re going to lose the election is if the election is 
rigged.”6 Of course, investment in such discourses may have been heightened due to 
Covid where, in the face of the fact that movement in public space need be limited, a 
number of states expanded access to absentee voting and mechanisms like vote-by-mail. 
Indeed, partly because such methods were widely used, tallies of results took longer with 
it but a few days after the election that outlets first declared a winner.7  
• Now, doubt about the results was likely to come in any case as, throughout the campaign, 
Trump had been cagey about whether he would accept a defeat.8 Still, any daylight was 
seen as a massive crack, as this gave way to a month and a half of litigation, Trump 
pressuring officials, claims he won by a “landslide,” and, at its most extreme, arguments 
from his lawyers that the companies who made voting machines were linked to Hugo 
Chavez and the Clinton Foundation.9 
• Naturally, the coup de grâce came on the day Congress should meet to certify results 
(January 6th). Around midday that day, Trump held a rally at the Ellipse in which he 
claimed that unnamed forces “had rigged an election like…never…before.” In the face of 
ne’er-do-wellism, he said, his supporters should go to the Capitol and “fight like hell.”10 
Now, of the 30,000-plus Trumpists gathered in Washington that day, most didn’t take 
him literally; they were content to make their voices heard through generalized freedom 
of assembly. However, roughly a thousand did, and between 1 and 2 p.m., the two faces 
of the Capitol were occupied, and the building was breached. By the mid part of the 
2
International Social Science Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 3 [], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol97/iss3/16
 
afternoon, the House and Senate were evacuated as pro-Trumpists ransacked offices and 
even occupied the well of the Senate. Indeed, over and above violent battles with police, 
as it came out later, things turned quite dark. Some protestors sought to “hunt down” and 
“hang” Vice President Mike Pence and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and, in the 
commotion, five people were killed.11 
Now, the shock, such as it was, came at a number of levels. For one, while the U.S. has a 
history of issues with inclusion (we all know the histories of segregation and slavery), the 
country is one of the world’s oldest democracies and, for many, a premier symbol of 
international liberty. As the historian Gordon S. Wood notes, the “experiment in [American] 
republicanism” gained influence in the 1780s, with the nation’s reputation as a democratic leader 
having persevered up to the present day.” The American “empire,” Wood maintains, concerns 
“liberty;” it’s the nation’s greatest export.12 Might January 6th put that in doubt? If Americans 
couldn’t pull off an election sans violence, what did it say about the nation, if not democracy 
itself? As several outlets noted, the U.S. fell victim to the kind of issues oft-associated with 
nascent republics and developing states.13 
Then, of course, there were the divisions within the nation. Culture wars aren’t new. They 
were fought during Vietnam, around bussing some years later, as well as anytime anyone brings 
up issues such as abortion and/or guns.14 Still, not only are there arguments over values, but it 
seems that today, Americans live in different realities. Few Democrats saw fraud; 95 percent saw 
Biden’s election as legitimate. However, one poll argues that 72 percent  of Republicans think 
Biden was illegitimately elected, and another that 52 percent think Trump de facto won.15 The 
country doesn’t just appear to be, but is at war over truth: what drives the country, do its systems 
works, and is there’s a “cultural revolution” underway to undermine American life (Trump’s 
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assertion on Independence Day 2020)?16 We live in “truth silos,” it’s been claimed.17 The center-
left functions with one set of facts while the center-right operates via something totally else. 
Nonetheless, there may be further dimensions to what played out on Capitol Hill on that 
day—again, perhaps like alongside Kent State (1970) and Rodney King (1991), constituting one 
of America’s more complex days. That’s to say that, within the matrices of each sides’ views or 
claims, we may have an instance of “dissensus,” or, as the political philosopher Jacques Rancière 
developed it, not just conflict but argument over what’s “given,”18 i.e., what societies debate. 
Generally, however, they do so over concepts on which they agree. For example, for both 
Democrats and Republicans, democracy is important. At the level of claims, anyway, though the 
appeal might be to the American Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR, 1948) may capture the idea when it says that “everyone has the right to participate in 
the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”19 Free speech 
has meaning as it’s a democratic tenet; it’s hard to run a republic minus freedom of assembly or 
expression.20 Indeed, invoking the UDHR again, “self-realization” may also be a point as the free 
exchange of ideas concerns the personality’s “free…development.”21 Again, fraud claims gained 
no official credence—America’s court system universally threw them out.22 Still, it may well be 
the case that more than a few rioters saw themselves as at the Capitol that day to defend the 
“rights of man.” 
Now, it’s curious, that—if one squints, one can almost read “human rights.” Now, I’ll 
immediately say with “human rights,” I don’t mean support for the UN, Organization of 
American States, or other “internationalisms.” Rather, I rather mean privileges as “universal” or 
derived from “humanity alone.”23 In this context, human rights explicitize inalienability—that 
rights shouldn’t be contingent on “judicial announcement, or some act of parliament.”24  Human 
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rights involve us with “international imagination[s];” generalized ideas of sympathy and senses 
of global good.25  However, they also concern claims present in a range of national 
constitutions—that individuals are “created equal” and all should be seen and heard. That’s to 
say that there’s a zone between the national and international in which we imagine privileges as 
“global” in the sense of native to all.26 
 The background for this concerns notions of an “age” human rights. For roughly two 
decades, it’s been argued we live in the times of rights as “last utopia.”27 It’s à la Fukuyama: that 
the East Bloc fell because it only provided “defective recognition,” and, come the Cold War’s 
end, global sought a new raison d’être.28 As George Bush, Sr. put it at the end of the post-Cold 
War world’s first international action, come the “new world order” people’s rights would be 
defended at least minimal sense (what lawyers call jus cogens).29 Here, rights equate with 
“humanitarian intervention” or “responsibility to protect.”30 That exists. However, it may be but 
one part of the picture. “Human rights” rights cut across the discourses of the “left” and the 
“right,” and, as Costas Douzinas notes, they link the discourses of the “pulpit” and the “state.”31 
Human rights are present when the gilet jaunes hit the street, and they’re also claimed when 
Antifa establishes “autonomous zones.”32 Human rights link the vocabularies “developing 
world” with the “liberals of …Manhattan,” and they’re the mantra of corporate boardrooms as 
well as the Zapatistas.33 For many, this designates a “culture” of rights: our “surroundedness” by 
rights claims due to the extensive dominance of human rights “talk.”34 Another has called this 
human rights’ “lifeworld”: our maintenance of intuitive relations with ideas of privileges made 
deeper by the “end of history.”35 
 In this sort-of thought piece, which is partly about January 6th but also much else, I’ll to 
make two moves: first, we can think human rights via international law (global covenants, 
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treaties, declarations, and the like), or we can see them as about privileges international law 
should promote but which don’t demand “internationalist” mindsets as such. I draw here from 
the historian’s debate on human rights: that if human rights are at issue, are we talking twentieth-
century phenomena bound to international organizations, or are we talking Enlightenment 
concepts bound up with social contract theory and the universality of democracy?36 No side is 
wrong, and the difference is thin. Still, defenders of the first point one may miss part of “human 
rights’” resonance—as played-out recently when arch-critic of international rights Marine Le 
Pen defended Génération identitaire (a European Proud Boys) through a “human right” to free 
speech (Génération was banned by the French government as an overly-extremist movement). 
After years of heaping attacks on transnational projects, Le Pen argued that movements agreeing 
with her worldview should be defended by Europe’s rights human rights (the European Court of 
Human Rights).37 (Human) rights involve what’s been called “the moral architecture of 
suffering.”38 However, they also involve what we might think of as the mundane rights of the 
citizen. 
 Point two, though, is that this expands senses of the human rights “age.” It explains the 
maddening ability of rights claims to justify everything from Russian separatism in the Ukraine 
to Amnesty letter writing. Yes, rights have gained challenge through our various waves of 
nationalism, including Trump’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and Brexit 
Leader Nigel Farage’s attacks on Europe’s rights conventions.39  Still, the concept’s kept on boil 
when the State Department establishes a Commission on Inalienable Rights to describe the 
“correct” approach to human rights as well as when Euro-populists hold that keeping out others 
(read “migrants”) actually helps defend “liberal-constitutional” values.40 Human rights “save 
strangers,” to use Nicholas Wheeler’s vocabulary.41 However, they may also be present when 
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protestors storm a Capitol proclaiming “life, liberty” and various pursuit of “happiness.” Now, 
I’ll admit I haven’t seen footage quite showing that. However, it would seem to be the 
association when rioters tote the Betsy Ross flag and wander Congressional offices shouting 
“1776!”42  
 My concern is with our culture wars: have we understood them properly? Have we 
contextualized them correctly and grasped the full breadth of their power? Objectively, January 
6th was no “human rights riot.” Subjectively, though, we might be on different territory. Human 
rights might be Bono, George Clooney, and save-the-starving concerts. However, they’re also 
deployed by nationalists to defend claims to sovereignty as well as ideas that democracy should 
be preserved locally to minimize the distance between the people and their government.43 Again, 
I can’t stress enough that I know 1/6 was built on a total fantasy; it was an insurrection based on 
nothing that concerned empirical evidence. Still, to not see January 6th as bound to the cultural 
immediacy of “human rights” claims is to blind us to its context. It also limits our possibilities 
for reconciliation and dialogue between our “silos.” In the twenty-first century “human rights” 
are nestled deep within our lifeworld. That involves the West levying sanctions against Russia 
and China. However, it also involves when Americans storm their legislature based on ideas that 
democracy’s been “stolen.” 
(Human) Rights 
Now, I will admit it as something of a specialist’s discussion. However, the idea of a 
specificity for “human rights” in part concerns books like Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia 
(2010)—a text advancing an argument not dissimilar from that I noted earlier: that in the wake of 
the Cold War, we live in a human rights “age,” except that, as Moyn sees it, “human rights” are a 
class of rights bound to the geopolitical imagination and a sense of global morality. Human 
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rights are bundles of privileges, yet also an “agenda,”  for world “improvement.”44 The idea is 
that we should replace the “impregnability of state borders” with “the authority of international 
law;” we should be driven by a spirit of bonhomie, in which “humanity” is our focus as opposed 
to national sovereignty.45 It’s a novel concept: as Moyn notes, few considered politics this way 
until the 1970s when, in a confluence of events—problems around East Bloc dissidents, protest 
against American adventurism, the rise of Amnesty International—we gained a presage of what 
would play out more yet-more dramatically post-1989: that the world tired of ideological conflict 
and sought batteries of concepts which spoke but “humanity.” The departure of other “utopian 
schemes,” Moyn writes (the grand ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), left the 
final one: the non-political politics of international human rights. A vocabulary born near-
exclusively with the UN flourished and remade the global agenda. Another has called this the 
“church” of human rights: mantras of benevolence offering themselves as “moral authority.”46 In 
Samantha Power’s words, human rights should address “problems from hell.” 47 They swing into 
action vis-à-vis material deprivation and the destruction of peoples. 
 In a historical context, though, important was that rights went from “birth” to “death” and 
“rebirth” as the concept was again about a new impetus—invigorations of a global ethics and 
appassionatats of the human. Outside of a handful of references (e.g., H.G. Wells in 1940), few 
had concepts of regimes that might monitor freedoms above and beyond state borders. Kant, 
Paine, and American and French revolutionaries may have discussed the “rights of man.” They 
didn’t discuss human rights, however, as the context was simply different. Outside Kant, few 
imagined global organizations which would monitor people’s freedoms, and even fewer posed 
social contracts as about much except the state.48  The issue, as Moyn puts it, was “feuding 
citizens”: as we constituted polities, how might we do so without descending into anarchy?49  We 
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might conflate the “universalism of the Enlightenment” with contemporary cosmopolitanism.50 
We shouldn’t, though, as, in the “Age of Democratic Revolution,” the issue was “a whole people 
incorporating itself in[to] a state.”51 
 It’s an intriguing thesis as it undoes a range of catechisms. The first is rights as “eternal” 
or that all expressions of “human responsibility to others” represent instantiations of human 
rights “thought.”52 Be it the Ten Commandments, the teachings of Christ, or Greco-Roman 
ethics, we often imagine “human rights” are somehow under the hood. It’s an idea advanced 
within human rights themselves (that we’re “outraged” by “contempt for…rights” because we 
maintain “conscience,” or inborn ideas of morality) and, as one voice puts it, it’s an idea 
proffering rights as a grand narrative or “meta” framework for interpreting the historical past.53 
The idea is that liberation is possible “at any time” if “men will only seize control of 
their…humanity, either by an act of will or… act of consciousness” (the terms of Hayden 
White).54 Another has called this human rights as today’s Bildungsroman: that even when we’re 
not thinking rights we are because we presume them they’re grounded in senses of self which 
root the human experience.55 À la Kant, remove the veils of “immaturity” and we’ll create the 
better society because emancipation is natural.56 Moyn disturbs this by suggesting rights as 
something specific—ethics, yes, but also ideas of turning the “sacralization of the person” into a 
principle for global governance.57 It resembles Rawls: that we might tolerate illiberal regimes 
because while liberalism is preferable, “decent hierarchical” states can honor “basic human 
[dignity].”58 We should have gender equality and things like voting rights. Still, most important 
is assuring humanity isn’t abused and that peoples aren’t subject to destruction. “Human” rights 
may resemble France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). Neither Lafayette 
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nor the Abbé Sieyès, however, imagined blue-helmeted soldiers establishing “safe zones” in 
Bosnia.  
In that context, catechism two concerns the Enlightenment; the resemblances of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political philosophy to contemporary rights declarations are 
hard to miss. Ideas of humanity as “born free” are present from Locke to the French Revolution 
and they appear again in Rousseau and America’s Declaration of Independence (1776).59 
Rationalistic images of the person are also an Enlightenment hallmark; Denis Diderot claimed 
man as a “reflecting, thinking being, who freely walks the earth” (the UDHR [again] argues 
we’re born with “reason and conscience.”60 Indeed, specific rights featured throughout global 
rights documents were also promoted by figures from Jefferson to Rousseau.61 Socialism 
contributed to human rights thought.62 Still, the calls for legal equality and the free flows of ideas 
central to figures from Voltaire to Kant are reproduced in many of the UDHR’s articles beyond 
covenants from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Herein, for many, it’s proper to locate human 
rights’ origins in the era stretching from Descartes to Kant.63 
 Clear-cut answers aren’t easy in intellectual history. For example, it’s true that even come 
the end of World War I (the “war to end all wars”), few suggested the League of Nations should 
have anything like the portfolio of issues pursued by the UN. In one scholar’s words, the 
“apogee” of internationalism came with the founding of the United Nations as it asked for levels 
of cross-border cooperation that were decidedly new.64 As the Versailles Treaty put it, the idea 
was “honourable relations between states;” the notion of “crimes against humanity” was twenty-
six years away (introduced with the Nuremberg Trials).65 When Bush, Sr. name-checked rights 
in discussing the “new world order,” he invoked ideas of a global consensus in which if states 
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didn’t evaporate, concerts of nations might agree on larger sets of principles than at any time 
before (we might finally fulfill the “historic vision” of the UN’s “founders,” he said).66 Still, only 
suggesting rights as the “Kosovo spirit” (genocide prevention and preventing deleterious 
violence) downplays the point.67 Above and beyond rote humanitarianism, human rights provide 
a “Magna Carta” of claims about specific privileges people should have not only across state 
borders but inside the civic spaces of individual states themselves.68 
 We might notice a few points. First, national self-determination is a human right. It’s 
point one in the ICCPR as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (IESCR, 1966). In both treaties (which form the International Bill of Human Rights 
[IBHR] together with the UDHR), it’s argued that “all peoples have the right to self-
determination” and “by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status 
and…pursue…economic, social and cultural development.”69 As rights were formed in the mid-
twentieth century, there was awareness of the claims of colonized peoples and ideas that 
imperialism should be left behind.70 To be independent was to “be taken seriously,” one book 
argues; it was a matter of dignity that peoples might “incorporate” themselves into a “state.”71 As 
Patrice Lumumba put it, the colonized “must be as free as other citizens;” people’s self-
determination was the “liberty” of modernity.”72 Still, that sets up an interesting scenario: we 
might be concerned with the Kosovars or South Sudanese (that they might be “free.”) However, 
with their freedom, they should do their business, like the Americans or French. Human rights 
proclaim freedom “above and beyond the state.”73 However, they also ask that people’s wills are 
represented in political life, and they dictate the “pace” of change.74 Yes, we guaranteed fair 
treatment in court, press freedom, and free opinion from concern for “others.”75 However, a) we 
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guaranteed those (not just general humanitarian attitudes) and b) they were for everyone “vis-à-
vis the issues around which one and one’s fellows might seek to congregate and discuss. 
 Point two expands this. Looking at the “core” international rights treaties (in which is the 
IBHR is central), items like genocide prevention or saving people from disaster in fact take up 
little space. Now, if genocide is thought through the right to life, it becomes a “meta” right as it 
precedes issues like freedom of speech. As one expert puts it, “a human being must be present in 
the world before being able to fill a space where he [or] she can unfold and assert his [or] her 
identity.”76 Still, within the IBHR, genocide comes up once—that in suggesting that countries 
maintaining the death penalty shouldn’t use it as cover for destroying peoples through claiming 
one has but executed “individuals” who have broken “laws.”77 Now, it is maintained that the 
Covenant on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) should be 
contravened under absolutely no circumstances.78 Still, ranges of basic civil rights—free speech, 
representation, due process, religious freedom, and even issues like healthcare (of the socio-
economic variety)—take up dozens of articles, appearing in the UDHR and again inside the 
Covenants. We sense this but can sometimes lose sight of it. News reports on famine and inter-
communal violence often capture the imagination as “human rights” issues. If we listen 
carefully, though, the term is used vis-à-vis issues like the manipulation of Poland’s judiciary or 
if Minneapolis police killed George Floyd out of discriminatory mindsets.79 That’s correct. In no 
human rights declaration is the preservation of “bare life” a complete end in itself. That’s a 
precondition for citizens’ rights, even if it need be acknowledged that all need have citizenship 
and that we need make sure everyone has a nationality, as the IBHR also says.80 
 And, indeed, is nation-formation a “non-international” act? In this context, I think not 
only of decolonization but the Enlightenment revolutions as well as the revolts of Europe’s 
12
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“long” nineteenth century. Clearly, few democracies realized their early promise. Even the most 
liberal among them— except perhaps the French Revolution in its radical phase—excluded 
women from politics, and we’re aware of the American Constitution’s designation of slaves as 
“three-fifths” of a person.81 Still, the vocabularies of universal humanity had surprising effect. 
We might look at the case of Olympe de Gouges. As Rancière notes, a liberal par excellence, she 
observed the exclusion of women from the promise of democracy. Speaking of “all men” meant 
became men, and not just an abstract universal. In response, de Gouges penned the Declaration 
of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen (1791), a point-for-point reply to the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, only with women at the center. All “free and equal” people 
should be accorded rights or, using the UDHR’s words, they should be accorded “without 
distinction.”82 À lathe petitions of Mary Wollstonecraft, it was a first step in a range of claims 
that would transform women’s status in global society.83 It bears resembles to Martin Luther 
King’s invocation of the Declaration of Independence: “all men are created equal,” he argued at 
the March on Washington (1963);” no one should be denied the rights that were every 
American’s inheritance. However, was the issue but national law? Or did it concern human 
principles on which the nation was built?84 It was “human” events about which Thomas Jefferson 
spoke; it was because we were individuals with freedoms that we might form polities to support 
them.85 This is a common occurrence. For example, when Ho Chi Minh announced Vietnamese 
independence, he started by quoting America’s Declaration of Independence. “All men are 
created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,” he said.86 
Indeed, he’d later use that ideology to combat America precisely under the idea that it was 
behaving as an imperial power and trampling people’s freedoms. 
13
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 In fact, this use of rights may not have been unintended. That’s either by foundational 
social contract theorists or various revolutionaries. Discussing Locke, it’s been noted that his 
work addresses humanity’s universality not just through arguments that we’re “born” with rights 
but through references to peoples of different cultures. In A Letter Concerning Toleration 
(1685), he maintained that “for the reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe 
[that] neither Pagans there, nor…Dissenting Christians here, can with any right be deprived of 
their worldly goods.” This was because “all [possess] the same rationality [as] reason is 
likewise” regardless of where one is.87 In his Treatise on Toleration (1765), Voltaire offered that 
“I say we should regard all men as our brothers.”88 “Turk” or “Jew,” we might choose our modes 
of life, and we had the right to decide. Indeed, leading the Risorgimento, Giuseppe Mazzini 
argued that “without country, you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights [nor] admission 
into the fellowship of…peoples.”89 Though a premier statement of nationalism, it bears a closer 
look: in the struggle for Italian unity, Mazzini maintained that nations should admit us to 
humanity—not exclude us from it, nor deliver some promises that others should not have. As the 
Czechoslovaks put it in 1918, the question was humanity—that “mankind” might reorganize.90 
We can monitor rights to see who upholds them; we can scan the world for people’s denigration. 
Or we can erect borders to keep out worlds hostile to rights; establishing enclaves to assure that 
the freedoms we desire are available to us in the places where we live.91 
 My point’s this: we have a right to life and that might be defended. “Sympathy 
for…suffering and pain” dominates the “acres of space” we grant human rights inside the 
popular mind.92 Still, is that the end of human rights? Is that the full breadth of what they are? In 
the past seven decades, rights have gained an institutional platform that allows us to institute 
tribunals on Yugoslavia and intervene in Libya or Syria. Still, if something more is at play—
14
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democracy, self-expression, justice in courts, if not a dignified retirement and the right to 
education—we’re on different territory. We’re talking ideas promoted in nearly all democratic 
states. We might think of it this way: in 2020, the European Court of Human rights made eight 
hundred seventy-one judgments. Forty-four involved “deprivation of life” and the “prohibition 
on torture.” Five hundred and twenty concerned liberty and security, the right to fair trial, as well 
as protection of individual property.93 Rights can be the breathless passion play of a movie like 
Blood Diamond (2006). However, they can also be the average citizen walking with their ballot 
to a voting box to make sure that they vote. 
The Human Rights “Age” 
When the ‘90s came, it’s clear there was excitement about the ideas of consensus, e.g., 
come the end of the Cold War, the UN convened the World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 
in an attempt to engage rights absent the filter of Cold War realism. Participation was massive: 
one 171 governments, 800 NGOs, thousands of civil society actors, and swathes of activists who 
hoped to avail themselves of the new global reality. As one lawyer put it, the decision to 
reengage rights seemed vindicated as “events following the fall of the Berlin Wall opened up” 
and there was an opportunity to not think systems but “people,” as such.94 This resulted in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), a document reaffirming commitments to 
the UN Charter and the centrality of the IBHR. We should continue our commitment to UN 
principles, the document said, and uphold the vision of the UN’s founders. Yet, we might do 
more. While the UDHR asked for rights’ “recognition,” Vienna asked for their “promotion and 
protection.”95 We might not preserve every freedom. However, as the UN put it in 2005, we 
might at least guard against “ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”96 
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The new spirit was quickly tested—in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995. Rwanda was 
catastrophic; major actors froze and, while interventions don’t happen seamlessly, non-
intervention may have resulted in three months of genocide.97 Bosnia was better. Reacting to 
events in Srebrenica, the U.S., NATO, and UN coordinated a bombing campaign that managed 
to stop hostilities and force combatants to the table. This was repeated in 1999 with Kosovo, 
though under murkier conditions as NATO acted without UN Security Council approval.98 Still, 
a precedent was set—as the younger Bush acknowledged addressing the UN in 2002, even the 
invasion of Iraq need defend “human rights.”  We should fight terror, yet war need involve more 
than striking back.99 
 It’s hard to evaluate “cultural minds”; That’s especially true vis-à-vis culture on global or 
“international” scales. Charting the Zeitgeist is like charting the weather by sticking one’s finger 
in the air. Still, post-Cold War, it seems we found ourselves in the midst of a human rights 
“chic.” Let’s step outside policy for a moment and look at the world of fiction and film. Next to 
policy, cinema and artistic media also seemed caught up in the new imagination, joining ideas of 
a greater morality to a defense of the human. Seminal might be Schindler’s List (1993), perhaps 
the preeminent artifact in advancing the Holocaust narrative for a new generation. Through 
“prosthetic memory” and vivid imagery, the film built “empathy and alliances” among a larger 
community that might recognize emerging standards and take interest in global brotherhood.100 
Speaking to the new values—remembering “barbarous acts”—the film was a hit due to its 
artfulness, yet also resonance with a moment in which global society seemed concerned to 
reflect. In two authors’ words, we gained a genre joining “catastrophe and care.”101 Indeed, that 
genre sold well: from The Interpreter (2005) to The Kite Runner (2007) to books like Persepolis 
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(2000), its works topped best-seller lists, and it seemed the mark of a culture interested in 
underlining new commitments to global sympathy.102 
 This links with other phenomena. Primary may be the expansion of global rights 
institutions.  This involves the growth of NGOs, whose numbers exploded come the 1990s.103 
However, it concerns the growth of rights institutions not only in areas with historical rights 
commitments (say, Europe and the Americas) but in regions from the Mid East to Southeast 
Asia. The Arab Charter on Human Rights was adopted in 2004; in 2014, this was turned into a 
statute for an Arab Court of Human Rights (though that remains in limbo).104 The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in 1981. However, in 2004, it became paired 
with an African Court on Human and People’s Rights to enforce that document.105 The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations has no human rights court. Still, it produced its own 
human rights declaration in 2012.106 Indeed, India and Great Britain strengthened commitments 
to international standards through legislation at home: the Protection of Human Rights Act 
(India, 1993) and the Human Rights Act in the UK from 1998.107 Over the past few decades, 
there haven’t been fewer human rights laws—on the contrary, in fact. The global “regime” of 
human rights has expanded, with few states not attaching themselves to both UN and regional 
human rights covenants.108 
Again, though, what’s a “human rights” concept? Are internationalist attitudes the end of 
human rights “thought?” The notion of a conceptual victory for rights is an oft-discussed 
concept—that in the post-Cold War age, human rights became a conceptual “empire.”109 
“Cultural dominant” might be another term. Borrowed from Fredric Jameson, “cultural 
dominants” are ideas we return to again and again.110 Indeed, some speak of compulsions to 
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speak rights. Are human rights always spoken just from desire? Or has the concept been hooked 
into our subconscious by way of normativity and systems of power?111  
 Vis-a-vis the latter, the answer is “yes.” There’s no intervention without force, and even 
those who appear to flaunt democracy (e.g., Trump) can only do so in the name of democracy 
itself. As concerns 2020, his claim was that an election was stolen; he wasn’t robbed of a 
birthright or ascension to the throne. His supporters say they protect democratic rights; they 
claim they’re assuring their votes aren’t watered down by people who vote twice or were 
supposed to have voted somewhere elsewhere. Again, massively few instantiations of such 
things were actually found; among all voting that happened in 2020 (not just the 160 million that 
voted in the Presidential election), even the Heritage Foundation only notes 1333 instances of 
demonstrable fraud.112 Still, whether Trump could have mustered thousands to storm the Capitol 
in the name of, say, fascism, is an open question. Three Percenters (III%ers) and Proud Boys 
might not be “small d” democrats (and I know; Charlottesville);113 however, if you ask them, 
most will say they are.114 
 Regarding point two—are globalist attitudes are the end of human rights mindsets— the 
answer is “no.” Rights ask for a “brotherhood” and they involve intervention; there are no civil 
rights if one must starve. Still, rights involve pretty specific privileges people should have, 
including privileges frequently guaranteed by the constitutions of states. Generally, we agree on 
civil rights—things like free speech, legal equality, freedom of religion, and a free press. Those 
are the “first generation” of human rights thought, or the freedoms of what we think of as liberal 
democracy.115 Few nations don’t gesture in their direction either in their state constitutions or 
participation in the IBHR.116  
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More complex are socio-economic rights: health care, housing, retirement, education, and 
the like. These form human rights’ “second generation” and they extend from social democracy 
and liberal reformism. In the U.S., they’re most frequently discussed around healthcare, though 
they’re present in debates over universal basic income.117 However, few pose them as ends in 
themselves. As even Marx put it, we need material rights because they assist with freedom of 
mind.118 
 Come the Cold War’s end, it was assumed that for Westerners, such rights were had. 
Europe and North America were democratic, and though the U.S. was light on social guarantees, 
the society’s general wealth might compensate for its skewed distribution. In other locales, 
democracy had to be built—from the former East Bloc to the Middle East to Southeast Asia— 
and to the extent the concern was economics, the question was bringing nations into the systems 
that made the West rich. Still, as polities built themselves, what should they be (a debate opening 
the door for today’s nationalism) and while internationalism might be lauded, it met with 
resistance. Why might the U.S. station thousands of troops on Saudi soil and to what end did it 
maintain no-fly zones in Iraq? How might we achieve equality in the age of globalization, and 
how did we ensure we didn’t “revassalize” the developing world to the West? As goods moved 
freely through the EU and NAFTA, how might jobs not just be shipped to the lowest bidder? 
What of new arrivals? More permeable borders meant greater movement and increased levels of 
multiculturalism. Such questions provide genealogies of events from the Battle in Seattle (the 
1999 World Trade Organization Conference protests) to 9/11 to Europe’s migration crisis and its 
contests over national identity. As many have noted, it took little time before the “new world 
order” was met with a great deal of skepticism.119 Still, that was partly due to rights: that in our 
age, we should pray as we want and vote as we want; we should speak our own languages and 
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build our own states. We should have freedom of speech and economic security. Indeed, after 
Cold War, did we not have the indubitable right to be ourselves? 
 Our culture wars didn’t just come with the last fin de siècle. From American Civil Rights 
to ’68 in France, problems of who’s in and who’s out (and what values we should follow) have 
weighed heavily on the politics of any number of states. The “clash of civilizations” may play 
out within societies as much as across international divides.120 Still, come the era of Clinton and 
Blair, what were we fighting? “National” law? Or a gestalt atmosphere in which we felt 
promised things in part due to international law about opportunity, representation, and material 
security? Was the idea not precisely that we might finally get what for a long time we had been 
told we were supposed to have had? In Hillbilly Elegy (2016), J.D. Vance asks what happened to 
the “millions of working-class whites” who “have no college degree?”121 It explains much, from 
the gilets jaunes to the Tea Party to nationalism’s rise in the states of the former East Germany 
which are today the Federal Republic’s most depressed. The circulation of human rights talk 
underlined ideas that we should express ourselves freely, and we deserved welfare; that we 
should be seen and have reasonable lives. It’s interesting that right wing-populists now form 
cross-border networks—that Steve Bannon makes league with Nigel Farage and Marine Le 
Pen.122 At work’s a convergence of claims concerning the primacy of peoples and popular 
democracy yet that today’s global norms reinforce our right to such things. As one commentator 
wrote in a proto-Brexit plea, “what about OUR human rights?”123 If the things Britons and 
Americans had been promised shouldn’t be had by all, what was the point of defeating “anti-
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Conclusion: A Historical Phenomenology of Human Rights 
Today, we may today stand at a crossroads. As of now, the populist right still hasn’t won. 
While January 6th happened, Joe Biden was inaugurated, and Democrats took the House and the 
Senate. Le Pen has captured significant momentum; still, for two election cycles, she has come 
up short in France’s run-offs. In Germany, there’s a chance for a Green Party Chancellor and, 
after the Trump government’s hand slap at the UN’s Human Rights Council, we (I am an 
American) want back into the body.124  No one thinks right-wing populism is going away. 
However, we shouldn’t be overly fascinated by the world’s January 6th as, in many cases, 
they’ve lost. 
Still, how can they stay? Short of imagining oneself as a xenophobe or inegalitarian (few 
people) do, how could anyone say, “no, we shouldn’t have a Congressional committee to address 
January 6th?” I’ll turn to a 2016 Le Pen interview: she’s a “democrat,” she said—she gladly 
defends les droits de l’homme.125 Or the “Q-Shaman,” if we actually return to January 6th—the 
fellow with the buffalo skins and American flags from the Capitol riots. Leading a prayer for his 
companions on the floor of the Senate, he said they were there for “inalienable rights.” What we 
might call “human rights” founded the American way.126 
I’ll end with two points: analytically, there is a question of how to account for the 
immediacy of concepts and their intellectual dominance. Indeed, vis-à-vis the Capitol riots, the 
most provocative figure might not be the Q-Shaman, but Ashli Babbitt. As we know, so 
convinced of the urgency of her cause, she launched herself knowingly at Capitol security 
wielding a loaded gun. She became one of the day’s tragedies in terms of lives lost. The 
sociologist Émile Durkheim spoke about social facts, cultural mores which result in concrete 
behavior.127 Foucault wrote of “epistemes” and phenomenologists “lifeworlds”—deep epistemic 
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conditions which determine our senses of knowledge. Together with investigations of the history 
of ideas, we may need to establish a “historical phenomenology” of human rights to explain not 
only the idea’s availability but how it becomes an intuitive, unthought point of reference. As 
Moyn writes, human rights may be but one “ideology among others.”128 The question isn’t just 
how historically it seems to have carved out a cultural space, but the mechanisms through which 
the concepts through which we’re confronted turn into belief. As Clifford Geertz put it, culture 
may be “webs of significance” that we have “spun.”129 Once spun, however, how do we relate to 
ideas and translate perception into ideas of reality? 
Politically, our task might draw from such analyses. While I have no tactic to offer, 
underneath our disputes may lay massive opportunities. Americans, Brazilians, Germans, and 
Indians may need a dialogue about who’s excluded and not, or who, empirically, is “really” left 
out. Yet, we might also talk about the concepts on which we agree. Eighty-five percent of 
Democrats and 88 percent of Republicans view the other party unfavorably; the numbers go into 
the 90s among hardcore partisans.130 Still, eight out of ten Americans think that governments 
should be democratically elected, 85 percent believe in the liberties in the the U.S. Constitution, 
and 88 percent believe in a fair judiciary and the rule of law.131 That is extensive consensus over 
what can well be read as “human rights” ideals. And it indicates that our silos are only silos to 
the extent that we’re blind to the fact that, within them, we often say the same thing. 
Was January 6th a “human rights riot?” No.  Still, it may provide evidence for the 
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